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ABSTRACT In this article, we present a comprehensive study with an experimental analysis of federated
deep learning approaches for cyber security in the Internet of Things (IoT) applications. Specifically,
we first provide a review of the federated learning-based security and privacy systems for several
types of IoT applications, including, Industrial IoT, Edge Computing, Internet of Drones, Internet of
Healthcare Things, Internet of Vehicles, etc. Second, the use of federated learning with blockchain and
malware/intrusion detection systems for IoT applications is discussed. Then, we review the vulnerabilities
in federated learning-based security and privacy systems. Finally, we provide an experimental analysis of
federated deep learning with three deep learning approaches, namely, Recurrent Neural Network (RNN),
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), and Deep Neural Network (DNN). For each deep learning model,
we study the performance of centralized and federated learning under three new real IoT traffic datasets,
namely, the Bot-IoT dataset, the MQTTset dataset, and the TON_IoT dataset. The goal of this article
is to provide important information on federated deep learning approaches with emerging technologies
for cyber security. In addition, it demonstrates that federated deep learning approaches outperform the
classic/centralized versions of machine learning (non-federated learning) in assuring the privacy of IoT
device data and provide the higher accuracy in detecting attacks.
INDEX TERMS Federated Learning, Intrusion Detection, Deep learning, Cyber Security, IoT,
Blockchain.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is defined as the use of commu-
nication protocols and sensing equipments such as sensors,
laser scanners, radio frequency identification, etc., to enable
control system devices to be connected to the Internet. Dur-
ing the last few years, IoT technology has been widely used
in the following areas: Internet of Vehicles, Manufacturing
industry, Internet of Drones, Internet of Healthcare Things,
Mobile Crowdsensing, Cyber physical systems, Agriculture,
etc. As IoT technology develops rapidly, there are millions
of embedded physical devices, where each IoT device is
interconnected and exposing data that can potentially affect
the privacy and personal well-being of their users. In the
absence of a credible security defense systems implemented
on the IoT devices, they can be attacked by hackers [1]
and are representing a large attack surface that is actively
exploited.
The availability of modern Machine Learning (ML) is
gaining more attention than ever before for its potential
to extract useful and complex data models using large
datasets from a central location [2]. With traditional machine
learning, the learning data is collected on a centralized
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server. without addressing the privacy concerns as well as
reducing data transmission cost. In addition to other security
measures, such as Blockchain and authentication [3], [4],
the machine learning techniques can be used by intrusion
detection systems in order to identify normal and malicious
actions [5].
The term of privacy-preserving machine learning has be-
come popular nowadays [6]. The idea of federated learning
is proposed by Google [7] to overcome data privacy issues
by leveraging collaborative learning across a wide range of
devices (i.e., IoT devices). However, there are various lim-
itations to the application of traditional federated learning
in IoT applications, including, the reliability of the learning
model as well as of the central server. By modifying the
local model, if the central server (i.e., Edge server) crashed
or modified the global model maliciously, updating accuracy
of all local models at IoT devices will be significantly
affected [8]–[14]. The constraint of power in IoT devices
is a major issue for the deployment of federated learning.
This resource limitation requires that energy consumption
should be optimized for the implementation of federated
learning [15].
The federated learning achieves great success and is
widely used in many fields, e.g., mobile edge network opti-
mization [16], Google keyboard query suggestions and pre-
diction [17], [18], COVID-19 detection [19]–[21], vehicles
communications [22], Internet of Drones [23], Augmented
reality [24], Intrusion detection [25]–[27]...etc. Therefore,
many cyber security researchers have difficulty in finding
the best learning type (i.e., centralized or federated learning)
to test and evaluate their proposed security methods in IoT
applications, and selecting an appropriate federated deep
learning method is an essential issue in this field. Hence,
we are motivated to realize a comprehensive study with an
experimental analysis of the use of federated deep learning
for cyber security in the Internet of Things.
A. CENTRALIZED VS. FEDERATED LEARNING TYPES
Fig 1 illustrates the main difference between federated
learning and centralized learning.
1) Centralized learning
Machine learning for IoT applications has conventionally
been performed by uploading all the data from each IoT
device connected with the cloud servers to build a standard
model which can be shared and implemented across devices.
The main benefit of centralized learning is the ability of
the model to perform generalization using data from a
cluster of IoT devices and then work with other relevant
IoT devices instantaneously. However, there are some issues
for traditional centralized learning such as privacy, latency,
bandwidth, and connectivity.
2) Federated learning
The core concept of federated learning is to create ma-
chine learning models that are built on distributed datasets
across different devices while avoiding the leakage of data.
Specifically, federated learning is a new technique where
the current model is downloaded and an updated model is
computed on IoT devices using the local IoT data. These lo-
cally trained models are then returned from the IoT devices
to the central server for aggregation, (e.g., the weights are
averaged) and then a combined and enhanced single global
model is returned to IoT devices. The distribution of data
is important in terms of federated learning deployment and
the associated practical and technical challenges. There are
currently the following three federated learning types, as
presented in Fig 2:
• Horizontal federated learning: This type is imple-
mented in situations in which the data sets share the
same feature space but differ in the sampling space.
• Vertical federated learning: This type is implemented
in the situations in which the data sets differ in the
feature space but share the same sampling space.
• Federated transfer learning: This type is implemented
in the situations where the data sets has different feature
space as well as different sampling space.
B. RELATED SURVEYS AND OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
There are many surveys in the literature that have covered
different aspects of federated learning-based frameworks for
IoT. As shown in Tab. 1, we classify the federated learning
surveys based on the following dimensions:
• IoT application: It indicates whether the survey pre-
sented a taxonomy for federated learning-based frame-
works for cyber security in the internet of things.
• Federated learning-based IDS: It reports whether the
study provided a taxonomy for federated learning-based
cyber security intrusion detection systems for the IoT.
• Federated learning-based blockchain: It indicates
whether the survey reviewed federated learning-based
frameworks coupled with blockchain technology for
cyber security in the internet of things.
• Threat models in federated learning: It indicates
whether the survey considered threat models in fed-
erated learning-based frameworks for cyber security in
IoT.
• Experimental analysis in IoT: It indicates whether the
survey provided an experimental analysis of federated
deep learning for cyber security in IoT.
Almost all of the surveys on federated learning for IoT
applications present security and privacy countermeasures
without focusing on an experimental analysis. Yang et
al. [28] proposed a review of a secure federated-learning
framework, which includes federated transfer learning, ver-
tical federated learning, and horizontal federated learning.
Aledhari et al. [30] a review of federated learning algo-
rithms, which includes use-cases, real-life applications, and
hardware platforms. Liu et al. [31] provided an introduction
about the integration of federated learning in the context
of 6G communications. Jiang et al. [32] presented the
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FIGURE 2: Federated Learning types.
challenges and opportunities of the application of feder-
ated learning in smart city sensing. Mothukuri et al. [34]
provided a comprehensive survey on privacy threats of
federated learning, but without an experimental analysis in
IoT networks. Kholod et al. [35] analyzed the open-source
federated learning frameworks for IoT applications without
focusing in cyber security. Rahman et al. [36] provided a
comprehensive taxonomies covering privacy and security,
resource management, application areas, system models and
designs. Nguyen et al. [37] provided a comprehensive survey
about the recent advances in federated learning and IoT
applications. Wahab et al. [39] presented a multi-level clas-
sification of federated machine learning in communication
and networking systems. Ali et al. [40] provided an overview
about the integration of federated learning and blockchain
for IoT applications. Imteaj et al. [41] analyzed the im-
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TABLE 1: Related surveys on Federated Learning for IoT networks.

















2020 Partial No Partial Yes No A comprehensive review of federated
learning as an enabler for the optimiza-
tion of mobile networks at the edge.
Aledhari et
al. [30]
2020 Partial Partial Partial No No An overview of technical details of fed-
erated learning enabling technologies.
Liu et al.
[31]
2020 No No No No No An introduction about the integration




2020 No No No No No An overview of challenges and oppor-
tunities of the application of federated
learning in smart city sensing.
Lyu et al.
[33]
2020 No Partial No Partial No A brief introduction to the FL idea,




2021 No No No Yes No A comprehensive survey on privacy
threats of federated learning.
Kholod et
al. [35]
2021 Yes No No No No A review on open-source federated




2021 Yes No No Partial No A comprehensive taxonomies covering
application areas of federated learning.
Nguyen et
al. [37]
2021 Yes No Yes Yes No A comprehensive survey about the re-




2021 Yes No Yes No No An overview of the fundamental con-




2021 Yes No Partial Yes No A multi-level classification of federated




2021 Yes No Yes No No An overview about the integration of




2021 Yes No Partial No No An overview the implementation chal-
lenges of federated learning algorithms
for resource-constrained IoT devices.
Our survey / Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes A comprehensive review with experi-
mental analysis of federated deep learn-
ing for cyber security in IoT applica-
tions.
plementation challenges of federated learning algorithms
for resource-constrained IoT devices. Nguyen et al. [38]
provided an overview of the essential notions about the
integration of federated learning and blockchain in mobile
edge computing networks. All these related surveys did not
cover the application of federated deep learning for cyber
security in IoT applications with focusing on experimental
analysis.
Lyu et al. [33] provided a brief introduction into FL,
alongside a classification for threat models into two major
attacks: poisoning and inference attacks. The study points
out the insights, the core techniques together with the
fundamental assumptions embraced by the different attacks.
The FL context brings an additional threat, which is model
poisoning, distinct from traditional data poisoning. The goal
is to make the global model incorrectly classify a given
set of inputs. To explore this issue, Bhagoji et al. [42]
conducted a range of attack scenarios, including: targeted
model poisoning by intensifying the malicious agent update,
improving attack stealth through the use of an alternating
minimization strategy, and bypassing Byzantine-resistant
aggregation strategies. Which validated the vulnerabilities
of FL-based settings to model poisoning attacks. Xu et
al. [43] proposed a FL-based privacy preservation scheme,
called VerifyNet, which manages the verification of the
training process, with homomorphic encryption, pseudo-
random technology, and a double-masking protocol to en-
sure user privacy, verifiability, and confidentiality during the
FL process. Results from experiments with real-world data
have proved that VerifyNet is practical.
A notable exception is Goa et.al’s [44] recent work
that reviews split and federated learning approaches with
respect to their communication overheads and conducts an
experimental evaluation against two established data-sets for
Speech Command and ECG in a Raspberry Pie setup. In this
context, we highlight the following research questions (i.e.,
Fig 17 that need to be solved:
• Q1. What are the applications of federated deep learn-
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FIGURE 3: Discussed questions per article section.
TABLE 2: Acronyms used in this survey.
Acronym Description
FL Federated Learning
IoT Internet of Things
IIoT Industrial Internet of Things
AI Artificial Intelligence
IDS Intrusion Detection System
DNN Deep Neural Network
CNN Convolutional Neural Network
RNN Recurrent Neural Network
ML Machine Learning
MEC Mobile Edge Computing




SGD Stochastic Gradient Descent
DRL Deep Reinforcement Learning
EV Electric Vehicle
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DoS Denial of Service
IoHT Internet of Health Things
PoCI Proof of Common Interest
GAN Generative Adversarial Network
IID Independent and Identically Distributed
Non-IID Non-Independent and Identically Distributed
ROC The Receiver Operating Characteristic
MQTT Message Queue Telemetry Transport
FNN Feed-forward Neural Network
SNN Self-normalizing Neural Network
ing in IoT networks?
• Q2. What and how is the federated learning used for
intrusion and malware detection?
• Q3. What characteristics do the federated learning
approaches with blockchain technology have for each
of the IoT applications?
• Q4. What are potential vulnerabilities that can be
exploited by adversaries in federated learning-based
systems for IoT networks?
• Q5. What is currently the best solution between
federated deep learning approaches and the clas-
sic/centralized versions of machine learning (non-
federated learning) in assuring the privacy of IoT device
data and providing the highest accuracy in detecting
attacks?
To answer the previous questions, the main contributions
of this work are:
• We review the federated learning-based security and
privacy systems for several types of IoT applications.
• We review the federated learning-based cyber security
intrusion detection systems.
• We present the use of federated learning with
blockchain for IoT applications.
• We review vulnerabilities that can be exploited by
adversaries in federated learning-based security and
privacy systems.
• We provide an experimental analysis of federated deep
learning with three deep learning approaches, namely,
RNN, CNN, and DNN. For each deep learning model,
we study the performance of centralized and federated
learning under three new real IoT traffic datasets,
namely, the Bot-IoT dataset, the MQTTset dataset, and
the TON_IoT dataset.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the federated learning-based security and privacy
systems for several types of IoT applications. In Section
III, we provide the federated learning-based cybersecurity
intrusion detection systems. In Section IV, we clearly high-
light the use of federated learning with blockchain for IoT
applications. Then, we review vulnerabilities that can be
exploited by adversaries in federated learning-based security
and privacy systems in Section V. Section VI provides
an experimental analysis of federated deep learning with
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three deep learning approaches. Section VII highlight the
importance of the study and discuss the significance of
our research on the future of the IoT and its applications,
together with current open challenges. Lastly, Section VIII
presents our conclusions.
II. FEDERATED MACHINE LEARNING APPROACHES
FOR THE IOT APPLICATIONS
Fig 4 shows the federated learning-based cybersecurity for
IoT. Tab. 2 provides the acronyms used in this study.
Tab. 3 presents the federated learning-based solution for
cybersecurity in IoT applications.
A. DETECTING COMPROMISED IOT DEVICES
IoT devices are being increasingly deployed in the everyday
life. Many of those devices, however, are susceptible to
attack through unsafe design, deployment, and configura-
tions. Accordingly, many existing systems already contain
vulnerable IoT devices that are open to being compromised,
which is furthermore harmful in sensitive tasks such as
surveillance, as shown by the work of Ciuonzo et al. [57],
which focused on the issue of distributed detection of a non-
cooperative object in a wireless sensor network.
While centralized learning-based intrusion detection ap-
proaches have been successful, including the hybrid hi-
erarchical and AutoEncoder techniques, as presented by
Bovenzi et al. [58], which provided a two-tier hierarchical
network-based IDS that performs anomaly detection with a
multimodal deep autoencoder, and soft output classifiers.
And also, the work of Mirsky et al. [59], which pro-
vided Kitsune, a network-based plug-and-play IDS that can
efficiently classify attacks on the local network without
supervision. However, data privacy, network latency, and
similar centralized learning-based issues are not considered
in these approaches.
To identify compromised IoT devices, Nguyen et al. [55]
proposed an autonomous self-learning distributed scheme,
named DIOT, which is based on a federated learning ap-
proach. The flask and flask socketio libraries are used during
the implementation of the federated learning algorithm. The
performance evaluation shows that the DIOT scheme is
able to detect 95.6% of attacks in an average of 257 mil-
liseconds. Zhao et al. [60] developed a federated learning-
based intrusion detection system, which can be used for
detecting compromised IoT devices. The proposed system
proposes that the global initial long short-term memory
model is distributed among all user servers. Then, the user
servers form their own unique model and start uploading
their model settings to the central server. Last, the central
server aggregates the model settings in order to form a new
aggregate global model and then sends it to the user servers.
The results of simulation on the SEA dataset (i.e., produced
by the AT&T Shannon Lab) demonstrate that the proposed
system reaches better accuracy and coherence compared to
the conventional systems. To find the best candidate clients
and solve the issue of accuracy optimization in federated
learning, Mohammed et al. [61] introduced an online state-
ful heuristic based on federated learning combined with
an IoT client alarm application, which can be used to
notify clients of any unauthorized IoT devices in the IoT
environment. The results of simulation on a real data set
demonstrates that the suggested system surpasses the online
randomized algorithm with up to 27% gain in terms of
accuracy.
B. SECURE INDUSTRIAL INTERNET OF THINGS
With small size, small cost, and limited energy consumption,
these appealing capabilities have made Internet of Things
(IoT) largely endorsed in smart factories to supervise ma-
chinery, guide their automatic processes, or to help create a
virtual representation of systems for advanced simulation
purposes using digital twins [62]. To provide the tensor
based data mining while guaranteeing the data security in
industrial internet of things, Kong et al. [63] proposed a
framework Federated Tensor Mining, named FTM, which
is based on homomorphic encryption methods. The FTM
framework is claimed to achieve high accuracy due to the
homomorphic attribution. Khoa et al. [64] presented an
IDS based on collaborative learning which can be applied
effectively in the Industrial IoT and Industry 4.0. The
proposed system builds intelligent "filters" for deployment
at IoT gateways to quickly identify and prevent cyberattacks.
Specifically, each filter utilizes the data collected in a filter’s
network in order to train its model for cyberattack detection
through a deep learning system. Afterward, the trained
model is distributed to other IoT gateways to increase
the accuracy of intrusion detection throughout the overall
system.
Rehman et al. [25] proposed an idea to enable a fully
decentralized cross-device federated learning system, named
TrustFed, which uses Industrial IoT devices as federated
learning candidates. To maintain participants’ reputations,
the proposed TrustFed system uses smart contract technol-
ogy and the Ethereum blockchain. TrustFed can identify
and eliminate outliers in the training distributions prior to
combining the model updates. The results of the simulation
on the Turbofan Engine Degradation simulation dataset
(released by NASA) demonstrates that the proposed system
performs better in terms of the lower loss irrespective
of the population size. Sun et al. [45] introduced a new
framework based on digital twin to assist federated learning
in Industrial IoT. The digital twin are used for capturing
the characteristics of industrial devices. Hao et al. [56]
developed a privacy-enhanced federated learning system,
named PEFL, for industrial artificial intelligence, which
is based on Augmented Learning with Error (A-LWE)
term embedded with the homomorphic ciphertext of private
gradients. To provide differential privacy, the PEFL system
adopts a distributed Gaussian mechanism. The performance
evaluation on MNIST dataset demonstrates that the PEFL
system in terms of accuracy as well as communication and
computation costs. To reduce the communication burden on
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TABLE 3: Federated Learning-based solution for cyber security in IoT applications.
Scheme Year Network
model









Poisoning attacks Turbofan Engine
Degradation sim-
ulation dataset
+ Less loss regardless of pop-
ulation size







- Deep reinforcement learning
Byzantine attack MNIST dataset + Efficent in terms of energy
saving, convergence rate, and
learning accuracy







Differential attack Two synthetic
tensors







- Limited Laplace mechanism
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users
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- Reinforcement learning
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MNIST + Enhanced the quality of the
local model update (QoLM)
metric











+ Privacy preserving as well as
driver personalization


















- Augmented Learning with Er-
ror
Inference attack MNIST dataset + Communication and compu-
tation costs
- Threat model is limited
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FIGURE 4: Federated Learning for IoT networks.
the federated learning server, a proxy server can be used
which is proposed Zhao et al. [65] to achieve anonymity of
participants.
C. SECURE EDGE COMPUTING
Newly emerging technologies such as Mobile Edge Comput-
ing (MEC) and new generation communication technologies
are essential to support the fast development and deployment
of the IoT networks. As IoT networks grow in scale,
determining the optimal allocation of limited resources to
deliver high-quality IoT services is a critical challenge. Edge
computing involves the processing of data at the edge of
a network compared to processing in the cloud or on a
remote server. To provide privacy and data security, Taïk and
Cherkaoui [66] designed a system model based on federated
learning and edge computing. The edge devices are used
to train models by federated learning, which can minimize
security issues. Lu et al. [51] designed a new system, named
DITEN, that integrating blockchain and federated learning
in edge networks. The proposed DITEN system uses Deep
Neural Networks (DNN) as a strategy scheduler to ensure
data privacy of users and enhance learning security. The
experimental results on two datasets, namely, the real-world
MNIST dataset and the Fashion-MNIST show that the
proposed DITEN system is efficient compared to the con-
ventional federated learning in terms of learning accuracy,
learning loss, and communication time cost. Qian et al. [67]
developed a privacy-preserving data analytic system, where
the federated learning at the centralized fog devices. The
proposed system uses an active learning in edge devices,
which can harvest the potential privacy benefits as well as
reduce latency and communication overhead.
To provide joint IoT network and edge server optimiza-
tion, Xiao et al. [68] proposed a federated edge intelligence
faremwork, named FEI. The FEI consists of a group of edge
servers that trains a shared model using the data collected
and uploaded from IoT devices. Cui et al. [69] introduced
a secure and decentralized platform, named SAPE, for
securing edge computing. The SAPE platform enables users
to send their assignments, which are then planned to the
relevant edge nodes to reduce the time it takes to complete
the tasks. To prevent attacks, the SAPE platform uses feder-
ated deep reinforcement learning (DRL). The reliability of
the federated training process is improved by a blockchain-
based verification scheme. The findings demonstrate that
SAPE overcomes some of the shortcomings conventional
schemes during the defense against adversarial attacks.
D. SECURE INTERNET OF DRONES
The combination of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and
artificial intelligence (AI) technology created opportunities
to facilitate existing ground-based mobile crowdsensing
platforms to achieve more difficult missions. More precisely,
drones enable autonomous crowdsensing at any time and
any place due to their remarkable benefits of lower cost,
faster operational deployment, and more flexible movement,
as presented by Motlagh et al. [70], which provided a
demonstration of the use of drones for crowd surveillance
8 VOLUME 4, 2016
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through face recognition. Federated learning can provide
significant privacy protection by allowing a collection of
UAVs to train a shared AI model collaboratively while
preserving the training data (i.e., sensed data) on their
devices at the local level. Fig 5 illustrate the federated
learning-based cybersecurity for internet of drones. For
secure and efficient AI model training in UAV-assisted
mobile crowdsensing, Wang et al. [23] designed a practical
federated learning framework, named SFAC, which is based
on three technologies, namely, blockchain, local differential
privacy, and reinforcement learning. Blockchain technology
is used to preserve data training and contribution verification
between drones, whereas reinforcement learning is used
to achieve optimal strategies. Their performance evaluation
using the MNIST dataset showed that the SFAC framework
enhanced the quality of the local model update (QoLM)
metric in the federated learning process learning, compared
with conventional frameworks. To defend against jamming
attacks, Mowla et al. [71] introduced an adaptive federated
reinforcement learning system, which can be applied for
flying ad-hoc networks. The simulation results indicated a
39.9% improved average accuracy of the federated jamming
detection scheme used in the defense mechanism.
To counteract eavesdropping in a fog-aided IoD network,
Yao et al. [72] proposed a secure federated learning scheme.
The main idea of this proposed scheme is that monitoring
the energy of all the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to
optimize the safety rate of the federated learning system
is limited by the UAV battery capacity and the Quality of
Service (QoS) constraint. The performance evaluation of the
proposed scheme shows that it performs better than two
existing related algorithms with a small federated learning
training time. Therefore, Yazdinejadna et al. [73] designed
an authentication system based on federated learning using
drones’ Radio Frequency (RF) features. The proposed au-
thentication system uses the Deep Neural Network (DNN)
and Homomorphic Encryption (HE). The DNN network
is implemented locally on drones with Stochastic Gradi-
ent Descent (SGD) optimization, while the HE system is
used to secure model parameters. From the experimental
findings, the proposed authentication system obtains a high
true positive rate when authenticating drones and improved
performances in comparison to alternative machine learning-
based systems.
E. SECURE INTERNET OF HEALTHCARE THINGS
The management of health has emerged as a major issue and
challenge as new complex types of diseases and symptoms
are introduced like COVID-19. Fig 6 present how the
healthcare sector can use federated learning techniques in
order to maintain patients’ data privacy, while benefiting
from other hospitals’ knowledge. Thwal et al. [47] designed
a deep learning-based clinical decision support solution,
which is trained and managed in a federated learning model.
The proposed solution focused on an approach to ensure
patients’ privacy and address the threat of cyberattacks by
allowing for the mining of clinical data at a large scale.
Based on a federated learning model, the proposed solution
can exploit rich clinical data to train every local neural
network with no requirement to share patient private data.
To decrease energy consumption in the federated learning
process, Hao et al. [74] designed a new scheme, which
separates the model into three sections and transfers the
central section to the cloud server with a high computational
cost. To perform gradients aggregation in ciphertext con-
text, the proposed scheme applies homomorphic encryption,
which can resist several existing deep learning privacy
attacks. For securing wearable healthcare, Chen et al. [75]
a federated transfer learning framework, named FedHealth.
The FedHealth framework combines different organizations’
data without losing information privacy and performs com-
paratively personalized learning of models using transfer of
knowledge.
The COVID-19 pandemic triggered a global crisis that
required collaborative efforts to combat it. A critical factor
in evaluating and responding to COVID-19 is the effective
identification of infected patients, and AI is a key part of
this. However, the problem with the old centralized AI is
the sharing of data among hospitals around the world, which
raises many privacy issues, and that’s where FL comes in.
Zhang et al. [21] proposed a dynamic fusion-based FL
system to analyze medical diagnostic images such as CT
scans and X-rays, and decide dynamically which clients
participate according to the performance of their local model
and plan the fusion of models depending on the training
time. The results demonstrated that the system is practical in
terms of performance, communication and failure tolerance.
Kumar et al. [19] proposed a blockchain-based FL system
for COVID-19 detection, which was trained and evaluated
on real COVID-19 patient data that was collected and pub-
licly published from various hospitals with different types of
CT scanners, as well as a data normalization strategy. Liu et
al. [20] proposed an FL-based model for learning COVID-
19 data. The authors evaluated the performance of popular
models, including MobileNet, ResNet18, and COVIDNet,
with and without the FL framework. The authors concluded
that ResNeXt shows the highest efficiency in images with
COVID-19 labels. Whereas, MoblieNet possessed the low-
est number of parameters. Hence, the work suggests that
ResNeXt and ResNet18 are selected to be better for COVID-
19 identification among the models used.
F. SECURE CLOUD COMPUTING
While conventional machine learning training models share
data centrally in the cloud, an increasing number of cus-
tomers are not interested in participating in data sharing due
to privacy or peer competition issues. Federated learning has
been suggested as a distributed platform to overcome these
limitations, where multiple customers collectively train a
machine learning model without partitioning their individual
datasets. Fang et al. [48] designed a federated learning
scheme with strong privacy preservation, named HFWP, for
VOLUME 4, 2016 9
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3118642, IEEE Access


































Data sniffing and storing

















Network Model Detailed View
Base stationAccess Point
6G 5G
FIGURE 5: Federated Learning for secure Internet of Drones.
securing cloud computing. Based on a lightweight encryp-
tion protocol, the HFWP scheme is robust against colluding
parties and an honest but curious server. The experimental
results on two real-world datasets, namely, MNIST and UCI
Human Activity Recognition Dataset, shows the highest
accuracy compared to other existing works. Zhang et al. [76]
introduced a federated learning scheme that takes the local
characteristics of AI IoT applications, which can enhance
the accuracy of prediction of any individual AI IoT-enabled
device.
For enhancing cloud computing-based 5G heterogeneous
network, Wei et al. [77] designed a federated learning
scheme based on end-edge-cloud cooperation. Within this
scheme, the nodes that are equipped with mechanisms for
attack detection are deployed in the end, edge, and cloud
of the 5G heterogeneous network. To reduce the negative
impacts due to heterogeneity in a cloud-edge architecture,
Wu et al. [78] proposed a personalized federated learning
scheme, which the power of edge computing is used for
high throughput and low latency.
G. DATA COLLABORATIONS IN IOTS
As IoT technologies are rapidly emerging, network applica-
tions require cross-domain collaborative computational pro-
cessing, which necessitates the aggregation and cooperation
of a large number of network data sources. Different data
owned by various stakeholders and having distinct properties
will be combined into the network applications within these
processes. The information that is revealed to the providers
of applications, results in the inevitable risks of losing
data privacy control. To enable the secure collaboration of
massive data sources, Yin et al. [79] designed a secure data
collaboration scheme, called FDC, which can be applied in
an IoT environment. The FDC scheme uses three parties:
a blockchain system, public data center, and a private data
center. The blockchain system is used to sustain flexibility
and access control, while the private data center is applied
for registration, management, storage, and IoT data collec-
tion. The performance evaluation on wearable sensor data
shows that the proposed FDC scheme provides efficient
accuracy and loss.
H. SECURE 5G-ENABLED IOT
The IoT network environments are time-varying, and the
network devices’ heterogeneous resources make it difficult
to provide reliable, secure, and real-time communications
among the network devices and their service servers, es-
pecially in the 5G-enabled IoT. Yu et al. [50] proposed a
federated learning-based distributed model, named UDEC,
in order to address the following three challenges: 1) Privacy
and security-preserving services, 2) Dynamic and low-cost
scheduling, and 3) Full use of system resources. The UDEC
model train deep reinforcement learning to secure critical
users’ service request data at the edge nodes. Their per-
formance evaluation shows the effectiveness of the UDEC
model in terms of energy consumption.
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FIGURE 6: Federated Learning for secure Internet of
Healthcare Things.
I. SECURE INTERNET OF VEHICLES
Vehicular IoT provides a safer travel environment and better
on-board experience, leading us to a smart and self-driving
automotive future. In particular, there are a number of
applications that can be found in the field of automotive
IoT, including, autonomous vehicles, driver assistance, ve-
hicle telematics, and predictive automotive maintenance. A
federated learning approach is implemented in the field of
data-driven navigation, which uses the data that mobile users
collect and embedded processing resources. Fig 7 illustrate
the use of federated leaning-based cybersecurity for Inter-
net of Vehicles applications. To address the challenge of
flexibility of participants under a federated learning-based
navigation application, Kong et al. [22] proposed a privacy-
preserving model aggregation technique, named FedLoc,
which can secure updates to locally trained models, provid-
ing robust support for participant fluctuation. The FedLoc
scheme is robust against malicious unauthorized participants
by employing the limited Laplace mechanism as well as
the homomorphic threshold encryption mechanism. Lu et
al. [54] designed a collaborative edge learning framework,
named CLONE, by using real-world data set captured from
a large electric vehicle (EV) manufacturing enterprise. The
CLONE framework is based on long-term memory networks
and a federated learning algorithm to proves latency saving,
privacy enforcement, safety preservation, and the efficacy of
driver personalization. The CLONE framework selects the
fault of an EV battery and related hardware as a case study
to demonstrate that the CLONE system can predict failures
with accuracy to achieve collaborative and reliable driving.
Lu et al. [53] proposed a scheme for federated peer-to-peer
vehicle learning that uses random updating of sub-pots with
no conservators, which increases both safety and reliability.
The process of aggregation is performed in all vehicles in
an asynchronous manner. When performing a joint learning
task that includes data sharing or leak detection, all vehicles
act as participants to perform federated learning. The infor-
mation from vehicle data retrieval is stored on neighboring
RSUs in the system in a distributed hash table form. Lu
et al. [53] proposed a scheme for federated peer-to-peer
vehicle learning that uses random updating of sub-pots with
no conservators, which increases both safety and reliability.
The process of aggregation is performed in all vehicles in
an asynchronous manner. When performing a joint learning
task that includes data sharing or leak detection, all vehicles
act as participants to perform federated learning. The infor-
mation from vehicle data retrieval is stored on neighboring
RSUs in the system in a distributed hash table form.
J. SECURE MOBILE CROWDSENSING
Mobile Crowdsensing is an emerging key element of IoT,
which is a model that employs individuals wearing smart
devices, called "workers", to conduct different sensing ac-
tivities. To resolve two challenges for mobile crowdsensing,
namely, user dropout and forced aggregation, Liu et al. [52]
proposed a federated extreme gradient boosting framework,
named FEDXGB, which is based on two kinds of parts, a
central cloud server and a set of users. FEDXGB performs
the following process. The central server takes an iterative
invocation of a sequence of secure schemes to construct
the XGBoost classification and regression tree. Within the
schemes, the FEDXGB framework uses a secure aggregation
protocol to aggregate user gradients. Through a combination
of Bresson’s cryptosystem and Shamir’s secret sharing,
FEDXGB allows the central server to perform constrained
aggregation on the gradients and is able to recover dropout
users’ data. The performance evaluation under both ADULT
and MNIST datasets show that the FEDXGB framework can
provide a computation and communication cost reduction
with negligible performance loss.
The data aggregation techniques based on homomorphic
encryption for privacy-preserving have been well-studied for
improving the privacy of FL systems. Zhang et al. [80]
proposed a secure data aggregation system, named FedSky,
for federated mobile crowdsensing, which is based on an
effective worker selection mechanism. Instead of choosing
a random cluster of users, The FedSky system chooses a
cluster of users based on the size of the users’ local data
and the computing power of their mobile devices. Compared
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FIGURE 7: The application of Federated Learning approach for secure Internet of Vehicles.
to the conventional FedAvg approach [81], the proposed
system can reduce significantly the computation time of the
users as well as the latency of the system. The performance
evaluation on the MNIST dataset shows that the proposed
system the maximum training time can be as high as 6 hours
under the experimental setting of B3 = 15 and : = 100 (B3
: the standard deviation for computational power; :: the
number of selected workers).
K. CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
Cyber physical systems process multi-source and large-
scale data in various domains of application. These data
are generally composed of private personal and incomplete
information, usually distributed across various devices and
locations. Federated learning is proposed as an efficient
approach for ensuring the privacy of cyber physical systems.
Based on a Gaussian mechanism and an optimized federated
soft-impute algorithm, Yang et al. [46] introduced a privacy-
preserving tensor completion method. Through a formal re-
covery error bound, the proposed privacy-preserving tensor
completion method is proven that can provide a privacy
guarantee with high accuracy.
III. FEDERATED LEARNING-BASED CYBER SECURITY
INTRUSION DETECTION
Tab. 4 presents the federated learning-based systems for
intrusion and malware detection in IoT applications.
A. FEDERATED LEARNING-BASED ANOMALY
DETECTION
Federated learning is a decentralized machine learning ap-
proach that exploits the performance computing power of
edge devices with no explicit exchange of user data patterns.
The local models are trained on user data on the device, and
those models are forwarded to a central server. Since it is
trained on sensitive user data, federated learning can suffer
from machine learning attacks against the locally created
models. To overcome this problem, Al-Marri et al. [87]
proposed an IDS based on federated mimic learning. The
proposed system is implemented and evaluated using Python
on Google Colab with the real-world dataset (NSL-KDD),
which the results show 98.11% detection accuracy with
federated mimic learning compared to centralized machine
learning-based IDSs. To address the need for securing traffic
and maintaining privacy in heterogeneous networks, Li et
al. [88] designed a distributed an IDS based on federated
learning for satellite-terrestrial integrated networks for an-
alyzing and blocking harmful traffic, especially distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks. The proposed IDS uses
two technologies, namely, 1) homomorphic encryption to
provide secure multi-party computing in federated learning
and 2) convolutional neural network for achieving higher
recognition accuracy.
To detecting various types of cyber threats against in-
dustrial cyber physical systems, Li et al. [90] designed
an IDS based on federated learning with a convolutional
neural network and a gated recurrent unit. The proposed
IDS system employs the Paillier public-key cryptosystem to
ensure that the model parameters remain secure and private
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TABLE 4: Federated Learning-based systems for Intrusion and malware detection in IoT applications.
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throughout the training process. The performance evaluation
under the gas pipeline system dataset show the following
results : F-score = 98.14 %, recall = 97.47 %, precision =
98.85 %, accuracy= 99.20 %, which are better compared
to three related works [55], [93], and [75]. Mothukuri et
al. [83] uses Gated Recurrent Units (GRUs) models-based
anomaly detection approach to provide real-time proactive
recognition of intrusions in IoT networks through the use of
decentralized device data. The proposed IDS can preserve
the integrity of data stored on local IoT devices by shar-
ing only the weights learned with the federated learning’s
central server. Huong et al. [84] designed an IDS, named
LocKedge, for IoT networks. The LocKedge system uses
the detection task right at the edge layer with high accuracy.
Therefore, the detection system is based on two modules:
feature extraction and classification. The feature extraction
stage focuses on minimizing features from the input samples
that are fed to the detection stage. The performance evalua-
tion under the BoT-IoT dataset shows that federated learning
results are lower than its centralized mode counterpart. Chen
et al. [92] proposed a federated deep autoencoding Gaussian
mixture model, named FDAGMM, for network anomaly
detection. Through the performance evaluation under the
use of the network intrusion detection dataset (KDDCUP
99), the results show that the FDAGMM model is efficient
in three metrics, including, F1-Score, Precision, and Recall,
compared to the deep autoencoding gaussian mixture model.
Based on the performing inference of detection models
and local training, Rahman et al. [89] proposed a federated
learning-based system for detecting IoT intrusion, which
can preserve data privacy. Therefore, the IoT devices can
take advantage of the knowledge of their peers by sharing
only the updates to a remote server. Then, the remote server
aggregates the updates and exchanges an enhanced detection
framework with the collaborating devices. The performance
evaluation on an NSL-KDD dataset shows that the proposed
system have an accuracy fluctuating around 83.09 %. Cetin
et al. [94] proposed an IDS, named FedAGRU, which
is based on federated learning. For collaborative training,
FedAGRU takes advantage of the computing resources of
edge devices and local datasets for training the model
and then uploads the settings to a server. Through the
performance evaluation under the use of the three network
intrusion detection dataset, namely, KDD CUP 99 data set,
CICIDS2017 data set, and WSN-DS wireless network data
set, the results show that the FedAGRU system provides less
communication overhead with higher detection accuracy.
McElwee et al. [95] proposed a federated analysis security
triage tool, named FASTT, for prioritizing and responding
to IDS alerts. The FASTT tool resolves the issue of the
high volume of intrusion detection threats that need to be
reviewed by security analysts in a manual process. Based on
the TensorFlow deep neural network approach, the FASTT
can categorize intrusion detection alerts and identify which
types of security analysts are to review the threats.
To construct a generalized model for anomaly detection
in the industrial internet of things, Wang et al. [26] proposed
hierarchical federated learning, where every local model is
trained by deep reinforcement learning algorithm. As the
local datasets are not needed during federated learning,
the privacy leakage risk is minimized. Moreover, through
injecting a degree of privacy leakage and an interaction
function into the anomaly detection concept, the proposed
system can significantly increase the accuracy of detection.
Based on a boosting method of logistic model trees,
Cvitic et al. [27] proposed a DDoS traffic detection for
different IoT device classes. For collecting federated data
from heterogeneous sources in IoT networks, Moustafa et al.
[96] introduced the testbed TON IoT datasets for Windows
operating systems, which is deployed in three layers: edge,
fog, and cloud. The edge layer includes IoT devices, the
Fog layer includes gateways and virtual machines, and the
cloud layer includes cloud services, connected to the other
two layers. Therefore, the TON IoT datasets employed
under the following nine attack families: 1) Man-In-The-
Middle (MITM) attack, 2) Password attack, 3) Cross-site
Scripting (XSS) attack, 4) Injection attack, 5) Backdoor
attack, 6) Ransomware attack, 7) Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attack, 8) Denial of Service (DoS) attack,
and 9) Scanning attack. To provide wireless edge network
security in IoT networks, Chen et al. [86] proposed a
federated learning-based intrusion detection system, named
FedAGRU, which employs gated recurrent units (GRUs)
models. Specifically, the proposed FedAGRU system is
different from the existing centralized learning approaches
by providing updates to the global learning models rather
than sharing the original data directly between the central
server and edge devices. Based on three datasets, namely,
KDD CUP 99 data set, CICIDS2017 data set, and WSN-
DS wireless network data set, the results demonstrate that
FedAGRU increases the accuracy of detection by around 8%
compared to other centralized learning approaches. More-
over, the cost of communication of FedAGRU achieves 70%,
which is lower performance than other federated learning
approaches.
B. FEDERATED LEARNING-BASED MALWARE
DETECTION
There are billions of IoT devices without suitable protection
measures which have been developed and deployed in the
last few years. The susceptibility of these devices to mal-
ware has increased the requirement for effective detection
technologies to identify devices that are compromised by
malware inside the network. Taheri et al. [85] proposed
an federated learning-based system, named Fed-IIoT, for
android malware detection. To impersonate the environment
of a poisoned sample, the Fed-IIoT system employs a
generative adversarial network. The performance evaluation
on three IoT datasets (the Contagio dataset, Drebin dataset,
and Genome dataset) using different features show that the
Fed-IIoT system performs significantly better than other
local adversarial training mechanisms. To perform malware
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detection in cloud computing environments, Payne and
Kundu [91] proposed a hierarchical approach towards deep
federated defences. Their proposed approach formalized
malware detection as a graph and hypergraph learning
problem.
IV. FEDERATED LEARNING WITH BLOCKCHAIN
Blockchain is a decentralized, provenance-preserving, im-
mutable ledger technique. It provides an efficient method to
remove a central server that is prone to attacks in an un-
trusted computing environment [108], [109]. To alleviate the
security problems that involve a central server in federated
learning, the blockchain model can be integrated with the
federated learning as shown in Fig 8 [110]–[116]. Tab. 5
presents works on blockchain and federated learning-based
solutions for cyber security in IoT applications.
A. PERMISSIONED BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SOLUTIONS
The implementation of distributed multi-party data sharing
in IoT applications is challenged by several issues. Based on
permissioned blockchain, Lu et al. [104] developed a dif-
ferential private multi-party data model sharing mechanism,
which is combined with federated learning. The proposed
mechanism can reduce the threat of data leakage, which
enables data owners to have more control over the access to
stored and shared data. The simulation results on two real-
world data sets (i.e., Reuters dataset and 20 newsgroups
dataset) show that the proposed system can guarantee the
quality of shared data as well as differential privacy.
To enhance the security of federated learning, Majeed
et al. [105] developed a blockchain-based solution, named
FLchain, which can be applied in multi-access edge com-
puting. The FLchain solution uses two ideas, namely, 1)
the channels for learning multiple global models and 2)
the global model state tree. Specifically, the aggregation of
local model updates is updated and stored in the blockchain
network.
Połap et al. [102] developed a privacy-preserving feder-
ated learning scheme, which is based on blockchain technol-
ogy for securing the Internet of Medical Things. The use of
the blockchain technology here provides security to updates
of local data, which are critical for the aggregation of
federated learning, and are derived from trusted devices with
authenticity. Furthermore, the local updates can be stored
as transactions in the blockchain network. The simulation
results on the Tuberculosis Chest X-ray Image Data Sets
with a convolutional neural network as a learning classifier
show that the proposed scheme achieves an effectiveness
average of 73,7%. Based on a multi-agent system, Połap
et al. [97] developed a security architecture that combines
the implementation of blockchain technology and federated
learning for securing the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT).
The proposed architecture enables separating specific tasks
to agents units as well as sharing and protecting private data
using blockchain technology. The performance evaluation
on Skin Cancer MNIST dataset with the ratio of 70:30
between training and validating shows that the proposed
architecture achieved an accuracy of 80 % for 25 iteration.
Lugan et al. [106] introduced a scalable security architec-
ture by deriving a new paradigm of trusted coalitions with
a high degree of trustworthiness which provides privacy-
preserving of data as well as motivation for coalition partic-
ipation in the absence of a central authority. The proposed
architecture is based on permissioned blockchains, which
enable deep learning that is distributed with rising degrees
of security and privacy. Lu et al. [16] proposed a permis-
sioned blockchain empowered federated learning scheme,
using digital twins to support long-distance communication
between edge servers and end users in edge computing.
The performance evaluations on the CIFAR10 dataset show
that the learning loss of the proposed scheme is improved
through the optimization process.
Through a shared machine learning model, Doku et al.
[107] proposed a federated learning scheme, named iFLBC,
which is based on blockchain technology. The iFLBC
scheme generates a shared model based on the aggregation
of the trained models. The aggregated model is then used
by IoT users to provide edge intelligence to end users. The
Proof of Common Interest (PoCI) is used by the iFLBC
scheme as a consensus algorithm to determine relevant data.
To perform authentication and trust management of fed-
erated nodes as well as the edge training model, Rahman et
al. [101] introduced a hybrid lightweight federated learning
platform that uses smart blockchain contracts for securing
the Internet of Health Things (IoHT). Their platform is
designed to enable inference process model learning, and
the complete encryption of a dataset. Here a blockchain is
used to aggregate the updated model parameters using multi-
plicative encryption, while the additive encryption operation
is performed by each federated edge node.
Through a shared machine learning model, Doku et al.
[107] proposed a federated learning scheme, named iFLBC,
which is based on blockchain technology. The iFLBC
scheme generates a shared model based on the aggregation
of the trained models. The aggregated model is then used by
IoT users for the provision of edge intelligence to end-users.
The Proof of Common Interest (PoCI) is used by the iFLBC
scheme as a consensus algorithm to determine relevant data.
B. PERMISSIONLESS BLOCKCHAIN-BASED
SOLUTIONS
The permissionless blockchains (aka. public blockchains)
enable any person to perform operations and to join as a
validator. Li et al. [98] introduced a crowdsourcing protocol,
called CrowdSFL, which is based on federated learning and
blockchain technology. The CrowdSFL protocol uses a re-
encryption algorithm based on Elgamal to provide higher
security with less overhead. The simulation results show that
the proposed CrowdSFL protocol can resist the following
malicious behaviors: Malicious miners, Malicious workers,
and Malicious requesters. To resist poisoning attacks as
well as membership inference attacks in 5G networks, Liu
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et al. [99] developed a blockchain-based federated learn-
ing protocol. The proposed protocol can provide privacy-
preserving of data based on the local differential privacy
technology. The performance evaluation using two datasets,
including, MNIST dataset and CIFAR-10 dataset, show that
the proposed protocol can deter poisoning attacks.
Wang et al. [100] proposed a secure decentralized multi-
party learning scheme, named BEMA, for edge computing-
based IoT applications. Specifically, each part in the BEMA
scheme distributes their local model and during that time,
they are processing the models received from other users
about their local dataset and identify the models that require
certification. According the BEMA scheme, the parties
broadcasts the certification message to the corresponding
parties. Based on the certification message, the system
parties are not required to exchange their dataset with
any other parties. The simulation results on the MNIST
dataset show that the BEMA scheme is efficient in term of
prediction accuracy under attacks compared to the baseline
models.
Based on the features of blockchain technology and fed-
erated learning, Sharma et al. [103] proposed a distributed
computing defence scheme for securing the Internet of
Battle Things. The proposed system is composed of four
different layers: data layer, edge layer, fog layer, and cloud
layer. The performance evaluation shows that the proposed
scheme achieved an accuracy rate of more than 92.7 %.
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FIGURE 8: Federated Learning with Blockchain.
V. THREAT MODELS IN FEDERATED LEARNING
As federated learning is based on the collaborative action
of all edge devices to build a machine learning model, a
machine learning model can be faked when only a couple of
edge devices are operating incorrectly [135]. Tab. 6 presents
the vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries in
federated learning-based systems for IoT networks.
A. INFORMATION LEAKAGE
The problem of information leakage from collaborative deep
learning is addressed by Hitaj et al. [118], where the authors
proposed an attack to leverage the real-time quality of the
learning operation which enables the adversary to train a
generative adversary network (GAN) to create a set of
targeted training patterns designed to be protected from the
adversary. Based on the analysis of the privacy leakage of
TernGrad [136], Dong et al. [49] proposed a secure and
robust federated learning protocol, named EaSTFLy, which
can be applied in IoT networks. The EaSTFLy protocol uses
privacy-preserving technologies, namely, Paillier homomor-
phic encryption (PHE) and Shamir’s threshold secret sharing
(TSS) in order to solve arising privacy issues. The per-
formance evaluation shows that the EaSTFLy protocol can
resist against semi-honest adversaries using two datasets,
including, MNIST and SVHN.
To train a deep neural network over a large dataset
can consume significant time and resources. One popular
approach to scaling is to fragment the training dataset, and
simultaneously train different networks on each of these
subsets and then share settings via a server of metrics. When
training, a local model retrieves settings from the server,
computes any required changes from its existing training
dataset, and then sends these changes directly back to the
server, which makes changes to the overall settings. Melis
et al. [134] founded that the leakage of unintended features
will expose collaborative learning to powerful inference
attacks.
B. POISONING ATTACK
Poisoning attacks focus on degrading the accuracy of a ma-
chine learning model by falsifying the aggregation through
the use of poisoned model updates, as shown in Fig 9.
Tan et al. [135] categorized poisoning attacks using the
sources of poisoned model updates into two types, namely,
model poisoning and data poisoning. Data poisoning is
performed by changing the training data in the damaged
edge devices, while model poisoning uses some predefined
rules to generates updates to the poisoned model. Zhao
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TABLE 6: The vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries in federated learning-based systems for IoT networks.
Threat model Definition Scheme Year Proposed solutions
Adversarial attack
- Create additional training images to ensure
that more of the space is covered
- Generate adversarial attack data and attempting
to classify these generated data
- The generative adversary network (GAN) is
composed of two components, including, 1) generator
and 2) discriminator
- The adversarial machine learning has two sub-fields:
adversarial attack and adversarial defence [117]
Hitaj et al.
[118]
2017 Differential privacy at different granularity
Ibitoye et al.
[119]
2019 The study uses two deep learning
approaches, including, a typical Feed-
forward Neural Network (FNN) and a
Self-normalizing Neural Network (SNN)
Hassan et al.
[120]




2020 The use of deep neural networks
Qiu et al.
[122]
2021 The use of saliency maps to identify the
critical features
Differential attack Privacy threat as the possibility of an individualentry being identified in a dataset
Yang et al.
[46]
2021 Optimized federated soft-impute algorithm
Lu et al. [53] 2020 Federated peer-to-peer vehicle learning that
uses random updating of sub-pots with no
conservators
Poisoning attack
An attacker inserts poisoned data samples








2020 Based on two concepts, including, Reject on
Negative Impact (RONI) and TRIM
Singh et al.
[124]








2020 Based two concepts, including, Federated
Generative Adversarial Network (FedGAN)
and Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)
Ma et al.
[126]
2021 Secure federated learning based on the
trimmed optimization with multiple keys
ur Rehman et
al. [25]
2021 Enable decentralization using Ethereum
blockchain and smart contract technology to
detect the poisoning attacks
Privacy Leakage
Attack
The attackers can deduce if an IoT device has been
involved in some mission from their local model
updates via differential attacks
Wang et al.
[23]
2020 The use of three technologies, namely,
blockchain, local differential privacy, and
reinforcement learning
Jamming attack The intruder’s intention is to maliciously interrupt
the victim network’s conversation by interfering or
colliding at the recipient’s side
Mowla et al.
[127]
2019 The application of dempster–Shafer theory-
based client group prioritization technique
Privacy leakage
Attack
The attackers can deduce if an IoT device has been
involved in some mission from their local model
updates via differential attacks
Wang et al.
[23]
2021 The use of three technologies, namely,
blockchain, local differential privacy, and
reinforcement learning
Byzantine attack
An attacker distributes a local malicious model
to other participants to modify the result
of the classification of the max-model predictor
Wang et al.
[100]




2020 The concept is the analysis of a small frac-




2021 Adaptive federated learning with digital twin
Shilling attack Shill attackers attempt to affect recommendation sys-
tems by producing many malicious profile users
iang et al.
[129]
2020 Designing four novel features from the gra-
dient matrices
Black-box attack An adversary can access the deep learning networks’inputs and outputs but not the internal settings
Chen et al.
[130]
2017 Ths use of zeroth order optimization
Papernot et
al. [131]
2017 To craft adversarial examples, the proposed
work use the local substitute of the target
model
Gray box attack An adversary has partial informationabout the defensive system
Apruzzese et
al. [132]
2020 Designing deep reinforcement learning ap-




2021 An improved classifier together with an at-
tacking generator
Inference attack
Allow a malicious participant to infer membership
and properties. The attacks is conducted
by examining data to obtain illegitimate knowledge
regarding a specific topic or database
Melis et al.
[134]




2019 Privacy-enhanced federated learning scheme
Liu et al.
[52]




2020 The local differential privacy technology
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et al. [125] proposed a defense security system against
poisoning attacks using the concept of generative adversarial
networks. The proposed system removes adversaries using
auditing data that is generated by generative adversarial
networks. Based on microaggregation and Gaussian mixture
models, Singh et al. [124] designed a security system,
where the clients of the system self-identify as members
of a minority group and advertise relevant features to their
peers. Even with a low proportion of malicious edge servers,
data poisoning attacks can significantly decrease recall and
classification accuracy, as discussed by Tolpegin et al. [137].
Fang et al. [123] proposed a new idea to defend against
the local model poisoning attacks based on two concepts,
including, Reject on Negative Impact (RONI) and TRIM.
The RONI consists of evaluates the influence of every
training instance on the learned model’s error rate and
deletes the training instances that have a significant negative
influence. Ma et al. [126] proposed a secure federated
learning mechanism based on the trimmed optimization with
multiple keys, which can resist a range of poisoning attacks.
Taheri et al. [85] uses two concepts, including, Federated
Generative Adversarial Network (FedGAN) and Generative
Adversarial Network (GAN), to create an architecture based
on federated learning, named called Fed-IIoT. The proposed
Fed-IIoT architecture can resist dynamic poisoning attacks





















FIGURE 9: Poisoning attack in Federated Learning.
C. JAMMING ATTACK
Adversaries can initiate a jamming attack against feder-
ated learning-based security and privacy systems where the
intruder’s intention is to maliciously interrupt the victim
network’s conversation by interfering or colliding at the
recipient’s side. Mowla et al. [127] proposed a security
architecture using federated learning for the detection of
cognitive jamming attack. Based on the Dempster–Shafer
theory-based client group prioritization technique, the de-
tection can be performed on the device while taking into
account the unbalanced sensory data characteristics of the
environment under training.
D. BYZANTINE ATTACK
An attacker distributes a local malicious model to other
participants to modify the result of the classification of the
max-model predictor. This attacker can induce errors in their
local model update process. Wang et al. [100] designed a
secure federated learning system based on blockchain tech-
nology that can defend against Byzantine attacks. Jebreel et
al. [128] designed a novel concept against Byzantine attacks
where the basic concept is the analysis of a small fraction
of the updates, instead of analyzing the whole updates. Sun
et al. [45] proposed adaptive federated learning with digital
twin, which is based on the concept of interaction records
and learning quality that rely on the use of malicious updates
to mitigate the malicious data threat.
E. ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
When an adversary is able to compromise an IoT device
without being detected, it can attempt to "poison" the sys-
tem’s training operation by falsifying packets as adversarial
samples that are designed to influence the model’s learning
in a manner that prevents the malicious activity from being
detected [138], [139]. Hitaj et al. [118] uses the differential
privacy at different granularities against generative adversar-
ial network. Song et al. [121] proposed federated defense
against adversarial attacks using deep neural networks. Qiu
et al. [122] proposed an adversarial attack against deep
learning-based network intrusion detection systems to attack
one state-of-the-art Kitsune [59]. The proposed attack uses
saliency maps to identify the critical features. Therefore,
Ibitoye et al. [119] showed the impact of adversarial samples
on an intrusion detection system based on a deep learning
approach in the environment of an IoT network. Specifically,
the study uses two deep learning approaches, including, a
typical Feed-forward Neural Network (FNN) and a Self-
normalizing Neural Network (SNN). The performance re-
sults on the BoT-IoT dataset show that an intrusion detection
system based on an FNN performs better than with SNN.
The concept of Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)
was introduced by Goodfellow et al. [140], which is used
by Hassan et al. [120] to generate adversarial attack data
and attempting to classify these generated data. The GAN
is composed of two components, including, 1) generator
and 2) discriminator. Fig 10 illustrate GAN with FL-based
IoT for cyber security [141]. To improve the reliability
of the attack/non-attack detection system for a non-noisy
as well as an adversarial setting, the authors proposed a
robust decision boundary optimization approach. To train the
downsampler, the proposed system uses a novel cooperative
training algorithm, which provides an improved delivery for
noisy examples with the real distribution. Throughout the
performance evaluation on a SCADA dataset, the results
show that the proposed system can classify with a binary
cross-entropy loss score of 0.47 and an accuracy of 95.55
%.
Recently, Rosenberg et al. [142] proposed a taxonomy
for the adversarial attacks in cyber security based on the
following seven distinct attack characteristics:
• Attack’s output: It indicates two types of attacks that
aim to modify a feature’s values, including, feature
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FIGURE 10: Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) with FL-based IoT for Cyber Security.
vector attack and end-to-end attack.
• Perturbed features: This characteristic of the attack
consists of the features being added or modified.
• Attacker’s goals: This characteristic of the attack con-
sists of performing incorrectly the security goals such
as authentication, confidentiality, privacy, integrity, and
availability...etc.
• Attack’s targeting: It indicates three types, including,
label indiscriminate attack, label-targeted attack, and
feature-targeted attack.
• Attacker’s training set access: It indicates the type of
the adversary’s access to the training set used by the
classifier.
• Attacker’s knowledge: This characteristic of the attack
is based on the amount of knowledge of the attacker
regarding the classifier.
• Targeted phase: It indicates two phases, including,
training phase attack and inference phase attack.
F. PRIVACY LEAKAGE ATTACK
In a distributed learning approach, the parameters of an
updated local model on IoT devices can keep disclosing
some information regarding data that has been employed
during training. Furthermore, the attackers can deduce if an
IoT device has been involved in some mission from their
local model updates via differential attacks. As each task
has specified detection positions, the privacy of the location
of the IoT devices involved can be leaked. To resist against
such privacy leakage attack, Wang et al. [23] proposed a
framework that uses three technologies, namely, blockchain,
local differential privacy, and reinforcement learning. Fig
11 illustrates a privacy leakage attack in federated learning
where a malicious actor compromises the aggregation server
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FIGURE 11: Privacy leakage Attack in Federated Learning
G. SHILLING ATTACK
Shill attackers attempt to affect recommendation systems
by producing many malicious profile users and rating target
items with extreme ratings to increase or decrease their
popularity. Jiang et al. [129] proposed a new idea about
designing four features from the gradient matrices in order
to detect shilling attackers. Specifically, the proposed idea
train a semi-supervised Bayes classifier. The performance
evaluation on two real-world datasets, namely, MovieLens
and Netflix, demonstrates that the proposed idea can not
only identify shilling hackers but also improve the perfor-
mance of recommendations significantly.
H. INFERENCE ATTACK
An inference attack is a technique of data mining that is
conducted by examining data to obtain illegitimate knowl-
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edge regarding a specific topic or database. Hao et al. [56]
proposed a privacy-enhanced federated learning scheme that
can ensure the privacy of training data during and after the
training process as well as resist model inversion attacks
and membership inference attacks. Liu et al. [52] proposed
a federated extreme gradient boosting scheme that is based
on differential privacy and homomorphism of the Paillier
cryptosystem against the inference attack. Liu et al. [99]
proposed secure federated learning for detection poisoning
and membership inference attacks using the local differential
privacy technology.
I. OTHER ATTACKS
There are other offensive strategies that can be used to attack
ML models, such as white/black-box attacks, or even gray-
box attacks. The black-box attacks only provide the ability
to query the network’s output or even have no network
knowledge, while white-box attacks suppose that the attack
target is available [117]. Gray box attacks train a generative
model to produce adversarial examples and assume only
access to the target model in the training phase [132], [133].
These three methods are generally categorized as adversarial
attacking methods.
VI. EXPERIMENTATION
We train three deep federated learning-based IDS models for
cyber attack detection in IoT, namely Deep Neural Network
(DNN)-based IDS model, Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN)-based IDS model and Recurrent Neural Network
(RNN)-based IDS model. Then, we compare the results with
the classic/centralized versions of machine learning (non-
federated learning).
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We performed our experiments on Google Colaboratory
using well-known libraries, including NumPy, Pandas, Ten-
sorFlow, and Keras. There are different open-source fed-
erated learning frameworks that can be used for simulat-
ing and experimenting the federated learning algorithms,
including, 1) Federated Learning and Differential Privacy
(FL&DP) framework (developed by Sherpa.AI), 2) PySyft
(developed by OpenMined), 3) Paddle Federated Learning
(PFL) (developed by Baidu), 4) Federated AI Technology
Enabler (FATE) (developed by Webank’s AI department),
and 5) TensorFlow Federated (TFF) (developed by Google
Inc). We chose the Sherpa.AI framework for its advantages
compared to other frameworks [143]. The source code for
the experimental evaluation of this article is available upon
request 1.
1) Federated Learning Process
In Fig 12 we illustrate the learning process applied in our
deep federated learning based-IDS model. Alg. 1 shows a
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FIGURE 12: The architecture of our federated deep
learning-based IoT intrusion detection system.
Algorithm 1: Federated Averaging
1 Server ( , , '):
2 F1 ← 4=4A82">34; ()
3 for C = 1, .., ' do
4 (C ← Subset(max( ·  , 1), ”A0=3><”)
5 Parallel.for : ∈ (C do
6 F:










1 Client (F, :):
3 B ← Split(P, )
5 for i = 1,.., do
6 for 1 ∈ B do
7 F ← F − [∇ 5 (F, 1)
8 end
9 end
10 Send F to Server
client sets, which is adapted from [7]. At the beginning, a
 fraction of  clients is picked by the aggregation server to
join the FL workflow, and carry out computations for ' fed-
erated learning rounds. The aggregation server produces a
random generic model having a random set of initial weights
F. Next, each client : retrieves the generic model from the
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aggregation server. Every client re-train the generic model
with its private data locally and calculate a new local set
of weights F:
C+1 for the freshly generated local model. The
clients share the updated model. Then, the server aggregates






C+1). After that, the
aggregation server sends the updated global model to the
clients, where each client applies the updated parameters,
to improve the global model. These steps are repeated until
the model is converged.
B. DATASETS DESCRIPTION AND PRE-PROCESSING
Datasets are mandatory for training and evaluating IDSs in
IoT networks. The selection of the appropriate datasets for
a specific task is also of great importance. The datasets that
can be used in the performance evaluation of FL approaches
for IoT networks are reviewed in Tab. 7. There are three
datasets, namely, MNIST [144], Fed. EMNIST [145], and
CIFAR-10 [149] that can be used as real object classification
tasks for evaluating adaptive FL for Industrial IoT. There-
fore, these datasets are not suitable for evaluating federated
learning-based IoT intrusion detection systems. Security
researchers use cyber security datasets such as NSL-KDD
[150] and CICIDS 2017-2018 [151] for the performance
evaluation of federated learning-based intrusion detection
systems [157]. These two datasets does not contain IoT and
IIoT traffic. In addition, NSL-KDD [150] is obsolete in the
age of IoT networks (i.e., Fog, Edge, Cloud, Virtualization,
6G...etc.). For evaluating FL-based cyber security solutions
in IoT networks, the security research community uses the
following three datasets: TON_IoT [147], Bot-IoT [152],
and MQTTset [154]. They are chosen specifically because
they are build from heterogeneous data sources as well as
collected from IoT and IIoT sensor telemetry datasets.
FL-based tasks require the data distribution to be Non-
Independent and Identically Distributed (Non-IID) and un-
balanced, which reflects the properties of the real-world
scenario. However, due to the lack of FL-specific datasets,
any pre-existing public dataset with engineered partitions
can be used to mimic data federations, as employed in our
experiment. Based on the datasets review presented in Tab.
7, we selected and used three real traffic IoT-based datasets,
namely: BoT-IoT dataset, MQTTset dataset, and TON_IoT
dataset. Tab. 8 provides a list of flow types and sample
counts for each dataset. Description and pre-processing of
each dataset is as follows:
1) BoT-IoT Dataset
The BoT-IoT dataset was produced at the Cyber Range
Lab at UNSW Canberra as a result of building a real-life
network environment integrating a mix of normal and botnet
traffic [152], [158]–[162]. All 69.3 GB captured PCAP files
with over 72 million records. The dataset is available in
a variety of file formats, including PCAP, generated argus
files, as well as CSV files. We used the CSV files for our
experimental evaluations. The dataset includes various types
of cyber attacks including:
• DDoS & DoS attacks: The purpose of these attacks
is to make services inaccessible to legitimate users by
using a group of compromised bot-nets. Both DDoS,
DoS for TCP and UDP attacks were carried out using
the Hping3 tool.
• Reconnaissance: or probing attacks, which is a type of
malicious behavior that collects user data by scanning
remote systems. The dataset contains two types of
such attacks, namely: port scanning using Hping3,
and operating system fingerprinting using Nmap and
Xprobe2 tools.
• Theft: The objective of these cyber attacks is to
compromise sensitive data. The dataset contains two
types of such attacks, namely Keylogging and Data
theft attacks, both of which are carried out using the
Metasploit framework.
After dropping missing values, we also dropped the
’pkSeqID’, ’saddr’, ’sport’, and ’daddr’ features in order
to prevent overfitting, we encoded the ’proto’ feature’ with
one-hot encoding. Then, we normalized other numerical





where, G denote the value of the feature, ` denote the mean,
and f denote the standard deviation.
2) MQTTset Dataset
introduced by Vaccari et al. [154] to address the lack of
support for specific protocols that IoT environments are
currently using. It consists of Message Queue Telemetry
Transport (MQTT) protocol-based traffic between various
IoT devices to imitate a smart IoT environment. It comprises
real-world attacks tailored to target the IoT environment,
including:
• DoS: This attack was conducted using the MQTT-
malaria tool
• Brute Force: The approach to this type of attack is to
try to recover the user credentials used by MQTT using
the MQTTSA tool.
• Malformed data: this type of attack is designed to
trigger several malformed packets and send them to the
broker, attempting to raise exceptions on the selected
service.
• SlowITe: the Slow DoS against IoT Environments at-
tack is a new DoS approach that targets the MQTT
protocol, which generates a huge number of connec-
tions to the MQTT broker.
• MQTT Publish Flood: This approach seeks to overload
the system by using a unique connection rather than
instantiating multiple connections using the IoT-Flock
tool.
3) TON_IoT Dataset
This dataset is introduced by the IoT Lab of the UNSW
Canberra Cyber, the School of Engineering and Informa-
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TABLE 7: Datasets that can be used in the performance evaluation of FL approaches for IoT networks.
Dataset Description Studies Fields (+) Pros | (-) Cons
MNIST [144]
Constructed from the NIST
Special Databases 1 and 3,
featuring binary images of
handwritten numbers and
characters. The dataset includes
huge handwritten data which are








+ Can be used as real object classification tasks for
evaluating adaptive FL for Industrial IoT.
+ It’s adapted to simulate federated learning tasks on
digit classification in an IoT environment.
+ Evaluate privacy-enhanced federated learning for
IIoT.
- The dataset is not appropriate for the evaluation of
Blockchain empowered federated deep learning















Fed. EMNIST [145] Constructed by partitioning the
Extended MNIST data according







+ Can be used as a benchmark for federated settings.
- It is not suitable for evaluating IoT security research
since there are no attacks in the dataset.
TON_IoT [147] Built from heterogeneous data
sources gathered from IoT and







+ Determine the efficiency of federated learning-based
IoT intrusion detection systems.
- It’s not adapted to simulate federated learning tasks
on digit classification in an IoT environment.
Fed. TON_IoT [96] Constructed from ToN_IoT with
the involvement of federated data







+ Suitable for evaluating federated learning-based
cyber security solutions.
- The main limitation of this dataset is that it does not
include digit classification for simulate federated
learning tasks compared to Fed. EMNIST [145].
CIFAR-10 [149]
Contains 60,000 color images
divided into 10 classes, with
each class having 6K images.
There are 50K training images






+ Extensive use by the research community due to
ease of use and support for a variety of ML and FL
based frameworks.
- It is not suitable for evaluating federated








Proposed to address some of the
issues related to the KDD’99
dataset [150]. It includes several
categories of attacks, including







+ Suitable for evaluating FL-based cyber security
solutions.
- Does not contain IoT and IIoT traffic. In addition, it








Consists of labeled real network
traffic, including complete
packet payloads. Used for







+ Determine the efficiency of federated learning-based
intrusion detection systems.
+ Suitable for evaluating federated learning-based
cyber security solutions.
- It’s not adapted to simulate federated learning tasks








Was achieved by engineering a
real-world network setting in the
Cyber Range Lab at UNSW
Canberra. It consists of real
network traffic for a mixture of







+ The dataset is supplied in different formats (pcap,
csv), and have been partitioned, by attack category and
subcategory, which further facilitates FL-based
assessments.
+ A lightweight version of the dataset (5% of the
original) is also provided to facilitate the learning and
testing process.
- The main limitation of this dataset is that it does not













MQTTset [154] Consists of network traffic of
MQTT protocol, for a combina-








+ Due to the lack of IoT protocol-specific datasets, this
dataset helps researchers evaluate their FL-based IDSs
in the context of IoT protocol security.
- Only applicable to MQTT-based protocols.
N-BaIoT [155]
Generated by using the traffic
generated by nine heterogenous
commercial IoT devices, either
infected with botnet and







+ Incorporate malicious traffic from two of the most
popular IoT-based malwares: Mirai and BASHLITE.
+ Proper combination with FL-based IoT IDS due to
the distributed nature of botnets.
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TABLE 8: Datasets description for experimental evaluation.
Dataset Flow Type Count Training Testing
Benign 477 370 107
DDoS +1.9" 154131 38530
Bot-IoT DoS +1.6" 132014 33011
Reconnaissance 91082 72919 18163
Theft 79 65 14
Benign 165463 115824 49639
DoS 130233 91156 39077
Brute Force 14501 10150 4351
MQTTset Malformed 10924 7646 3278
SlowITe 9202 6441 2761
Flood 613 429 184
Benign 35000 28000 7000
Password 5000 4000 1000
TON_IoT Backdoor 5000 4000 1000
Injection 5000 4000 1000
XSS 577 461 116
Scanning 529 423 106
tion technology (SEIT), UNSW Canberra at the Australian
Defence Force Academy (ADFA) [148] for the collection
and analysis of mixed data sources from IoT and Industrial
IoT (IIoT). The benchmark was conducted using several
virtual machines that included multiple operating systems to
address the cross-layer connectivity between the three tiers:
IIoT, Cloud, and Edge/Fog systems. Parallel processing was
used to assemble the datasets to gather diverse benign and
attack traffic, for IoT telemetry data service. It includes
different attacking techniques, such as:
• Password Cracking: This type of attack is intended to
allow the attacker to overcome authentication schemes
in order to compromise the IIoT devices. It was con-
ducted using CeWL and Hydra toolkits.
• Backdoor: With this kind of attack, it is possible for
attackers to obtain non-authorized remote access to
IIoT devices affected by a backdoor malware. The
framework used for these attacks is the Metasploitable3
framework.
• Injection: With this attack, the adversary aims to inject
malicious data into the IIoT applications.
• XSS: the adversary frequently tries to run malicious
commands in IIoT applications through a web server.
• Scanning: scanning tools, such as Nmap and Nessus
tools, allow the attacker to perform scanning attacks
against the IoT/IIoT devices and MQTT broker in a
public network.
To prevent overfitting, we dropped the ’date’ and ’saddr’
features. Then, we used the Z-Score normalization strategy
for numerical features.
C. USE CASES AND PERFORMANCE METRICS
For the purpose of evaluating our experiment, we employed
two use cases, namely:
• Centralized learning approach: The data is located at
a single location with three well-known deep learning
classifiers, i.e., DNN, CNN, and RNN.
• Federated learning approach: The data is located










































FIGURE 13: Centralized model performance.
used to aggregate the models of the clients. We used
also the same classifiers as in the previous approach.
We used three sets of client distributions:  =5,  =10,
and  =15, with two data distribution methods: 1) in-
dependent and identically distributed (IID) and 2) non-
independent and identically distributed (Non-IID), over 50
federated learning rounds. Tab. 9 shows the different pa-
rameters used in the three deep learning models for the
centralized and federated learning approaches.
When conducting intrusion detection performance analy-
sis, the most common metrics used are:
• True Positive (TP): is used to determine the number of
attack patterns that are properly classified as attacks.
• False Positive (FP): is used to determine the number of
normal patterns that are wrongly classified as attacks.
• True Negative (TN): is used to determine the number of
normal patterns that are proportion classified as normal.
• False Negative (FN): is used to determine the number
of attack patterns that are wrongly classified as normal.
• Accuracy: is used to determine the proportion of correct
classifications to the total number of entries, which is
given by :
)% + )#
)% + )# + % + # (2)
• Precision: denotes the proportion of correct intrusion
classes to the total amount of predicted intrusion re-
sults, which can be given by :
)%
)% + % (3)
• Recall: denotes the proportion of proper attack classifi-
cations relative to the overall count of all samples that
ought to have been identified as attacks, it is given by
:
)%
)% + # (4)
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TABLE 9: Settings for deep learning classifiers.
Classifier Parameter Value Motivation
DNN Hidden nodes 25-60 The balance between neurons with the appropriatenumber of hidden layers leads to a better efficiency.Hidden layers 2
CNN
Convolutional layers 2 Conv1D Convolution layers, filters, and pooling layers apart
from the neurons, significantly reduce the number of
trainable parameters as compared to fully connected
networks. By using several such processes, it is




Pooling layers 1 Global Average Pooling 1D
Hidden nodes 39-60
Hidden layers 2
RNN Hidden nodes 22-60 The model can handle inputs of any given length, asthe model size doesn’t increase with the input size.Hidden LSTM layers 2
*
Batch size 1000 For each model, the activation function is ReLu, the
output layer is SoftMax since there is a multi-class
classification, the loss function is
categorical_crossentropy, and the optimization process
is Adam. To prevent overfitting, we used two methods:
dropout and !2 regularization. In order to ensure that
each device gains knowledge before sharing it with its











TABLE 10: The evaluation results of centralized learning approaches.
Precision Recall 1-Score
Dataset Class DNN CNN RNN DNN CNN RNN DNN CNN RNN
Benign 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
DDoS 97% 95% 97% 94% 97% 95% 96% 96% 96%
Bot-IoT DoS 94% 97% 95% 96% 93% 97% 95% 95% 96%
Reconnaissance 96% 97% 99% 99% 99% 99% 97% 98% 99%
Theft 00% 00% 100% 00% 00% 36% 00% 00% 53%
Benign 92% 91% 91% 94% 94% 94% 93% 93% 93%
DoS 91% 90% 90% 89% 89% 89% 90% 90% 90%
Brute Force 69% 69% 66% 84% 86% 86% 76% 76% 75%
MQTTset Malformed 80% 86% 80% 39% 30% 20% 52% 45% 32%
SlowITe 98% 97% 100% 100% 96% 93% 99% 96% 96%
Flood 82% 89% 100% 35% 48% 03% 61% 50% 05%
Benign 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Injection 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Backdoor 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
TON_IoT Password 97% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 98% 95% 100%
XSS 100% 00% 100% 72% 00% 100% 83% 00% 100%
Scanning 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
• 1-Score: reports the Harmonic Mean between Preci-
sion and Recall, which is given by:
2 · %A428B8>= · '420;;
%A428B8>= + '420;; (5)
D. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The outcomes achieved from both experimental use cases
are as follows:
1) Centralized Learning Models
Fig 13 presents the accuracy of deep learning techniques
(DNN, CNN, and RNN) in multiclass classification for
the three datasets (Bot-IoT, MQTTset, and TON_IoT). The
highest accuracy for the Bot-IoT dataset was obtained
using the RNN classifier which achieved 96.76%, while the
lowest accuracy was obtained using the DNN classifier with
95.76%. For the MQTTset dataset, the highest accuracy
was obtained using the DNN classifier which achieved
90.06%, while the lowest accuracy was obtained using the
RNN classifier with 89.29%. The highest accuracy for the
TON_IoT dataset was obtained using the RNN classifier
which achieved 99.98%, while the lowest accuracy was
obtained using the CNN classifier with 98.87%.
Tab. 10 provides the obtained centralized model results
of deep learning techniques in terms of Precision, Recall,
and 1-score under multi-class classification, which reports
the performance of the different models against the different
benign and attack classes in the three datasets.
Fig 14 presents the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curves for five classes in the BoT-IoT dataset,
namely: class DDoS, class DoS, class Benign, class Re-
connaissance, and class Theft. All values are between 0.99
and 1.00. Fig 15 presents the ROC curves for five classes in
the MQTTset dataset, namely: class Bruteforce, class DoS,
class Flood, class Benign, and class Slowite. All values are
between 0.94 and 0.98. Fig 16 presents the ROC curves
for five classes in the TON_IoT dataset, namely: class
Backdoor, class Injection, class Benign, class Password, and
class Scanning.
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(a) DNN (b) CNN (c) RNN
FIGURE 14: The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for BoT-IoT dataset. (class 0: DDoS, class 1: DoS, class
2: Benign, class 3: Reconnaissance, class 4: Theft)
(a) DNN (b) CNN (c) RNN
FIGURE 15: The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for MQTTset datasets. (class 0: Bruteforce, class 1: DoS,
class 2: Flood, class 3: Benign, class 4: Slowite, class 5: Malformed)
2) Federated Learning Models
In this experimental setup rather than locating all data in
one location and conducting the learning from there, a
federated deep learning approach is used, where the data
never leaves the client side along with the shared knowledge
that goes back and forth between the aggregation server and
the participating clients.
Fig 17 report the validation accuracy for each global
model against the centralized model across all datasets
and all classifiers. Fig 17 (a) plots the validation accuracy
achieved by the federated deep learning classifiers (DNN,
CNN, RNN) with both the IID and Non-IID data distribution
strategies for the Bot-IoT dataset. For the IID data distri-
bution strategy, the federated deep learning global models
were able to approximate the performance of the centralized
learning models. For the non-IDI data distribution strategy,
the global models struggled a bit to perform the same as
in IID, which is quite normal since the data samples were
randomly distributed for all clients, however after 50 FL
runs, the overall performance was pretty good. Fig 17 (b)
and Fig 17 (c) illustrate the validation accuracy obtained
by the federated deep learning classifiers with the IID and
Non-IID data distribution strategies for the MQTTset and
TON_IoT datasets, respectively. Similar to the first data set,
the same observations apply to these two experiments.
Tab. 11 present a detailed side-by-side comparison of
all accuracies obtained by all global models and the high-
est/lowest accuracy of the best/worst clients couple in every
set, across the first and the 50Cℎ round of federated deep
learning. The first observation is that in the IID data distribu-
tion strategy, the Best, Worst, and Global models are closely
related to each other consistently across all settings and
datasets, even though the clients are trained from different
class samples. The reason being that all clients can learn
from all classes. The second observation is that at the 50Cℎ
rounds of federated deep learning, the performance of all
global models managed to approach the performance of the
centralized model.
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(a) DNN (b) CNN (c) RNN
FIGURE 16: The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for TON_IOT dataset. (class 0: Backdoor, class 1: Injection,
class 2: Benign, class 3: Password, class 4: Scanning, class 5: XSS)
TABLE 11: The evaluation results of federated deep learning approaches.
1BC round 50Cℎ round
IID Non IID IID Non IID
Dataset Classifier Clients B W G B W G B W G B W G
 = 5 48.12% 45.71% 48.04% 54.17% 42.89% 42.89% 92.80% 92.24% 92.49% 91.76% 61.29% 91.98%
DNN  = 10 42.89% 42.89% 42.89% 56.59% 20.22% 56.12% 92.20% 91.83% 92.03% 90.99% 56.18% 91.28%
 = 15 51.33% 48.80% 50.21% 60.31% 20.32% 54.37% 91.55% 90.92% 91.39% 87.65% 63.48% 88.03%
 = 5 63.22% 62.21% 62.69% 64.23% 36.75% 42.89% 94.75% 94.36% 94.61% 93.19% 48.13% 89.91%
Bot-IoT CNN  = 10 47.42% 45.83% 46.34% 42.89% 20.22% 40.17% 94.08% 93.70% 94.06% 89.88% 48.54% 86.34%
 = 15 53.74% 42.89% 44.54% 64.85% 01.00% 41.61% 93.89% 93.08% 93.74% 90.59% 52.98% 90.35%
 = 5 47.81% 47.51% 47.68% 60.90% 42.89% 42.92% 95.38% 95.29% 95.47% 92.96% 65.64% 88.56%
RNN  = 10 44.10% 42.92% 43.44% 51.06% 40.08% 43.48% 94.51% 94.39% 94.50% 89.58% 63.96% 88.67%
 = 15 47.24% 42.92% 44.70% 44.74% 20.24% 45.76% 92.59% 91.74% 92.24% 85.92% 64.68% 86.28%
 = 5 76.02% 69.36% 71.68% 71.87% 38.75% 66.17% 85.71% 80.23% 84.81% 83.03% 41.36% 85.68%
DNN  = 10 77.85% 68.65% 77.91% 77.60% 04.20% 71.64% 82.86% 82.27% 82.60% 78.30% 25.99% 77.88%
 = 15 77.98% 71.57% 75.01% 68.35% 20.46% 61.37% 83.94% 80.58% 83.68% 78.42% 45.06% 78.03%
 = 5 77.89% 71.79% 77.87% 73.52% 39.35% 66.09% 88.01% 83.09% 88.06% 86.08% 39.41% 86.45%
MQTTset CNN  = 10 76.23% 67.19% 72.60% 63.55% 17.54% 42.25% 84.91% 84.00% 84.40% 80.91% 46.11% 81.16%
 = 15 60.67% 57.01% 60.05% 68.81% 04.13% 51.59% 79.01% 78.63% 78.68% 78.01% 57.48% 77.80%
 = 5 64.56% 63.65% 64.36% 76.11% 49.99% 74.10% 88.47% 87.45% 88.23% 86.04% 83.91% 86.16%
RNN  = 10 75.33% 73.33% 74.34% 77.24% 03.96% 71.13% 83.81% 81.60% 82.73% 84.59% 42.46% 80.73%
 = 15 71.51% 66.47% 67.69% 70.98% 03.69% 39.01% 85.23% 83.24% 84.69% 83.82% 44.56% 70.47%
 = 5 67.15% 67.11% 67.15% 68.47% 09.78% 68.47% 97.96% 96.64% 97.95% 68.47% 68.47% 68.47%
DNN  = 10 67.11% 67.11% 67.11% 68.47% 09.78% 68.47% 98.03% 94.48% 97.95% 75.39% 74.88% 74.93%
 = 15 58.72% 58.72% 58.72% 68.47% 09.78% 68.47% 96.59% 86.74% 97.16% 68.47% 68.47% 68.47%
 = 5 68.47% 68.47% 68.47% 68.47% 68.47% 68.47% 98.86% 98.86% 98.86% 96.46% 70.65% 95.82%
TON_IoT CNN  = 10 68.47% 68.47% 68.47% 68.47% 08.45% 49.96% 98.62% 97.77% 97.86% 80.13% 78.26% 79.63%
 = 15 69.50% 68.63% 68.90% 68.47% 10.13% 68.47% 96.83% 93.05% 96.10% 80.63% 78.26% 80.57%
 = 5 68.47% 68.47% 68.47% 68.47% 09.78% 68.47% 98.86% 98.86% 98.86% 82.08% 78.26% 76.72%
RNN  = 10 68.47% 68.47% 68.47% 68.47% 03.53% 68.47% 92.90% 88.04% 90.70% 78.26% 78.26% 78.26%
 = 15 68.47% 68.47% 68.47% 68.47% 09.78% 68.47% 84.85% 79.90% 83.35% 78.26% 78.26% 78.26%
(B): Best client accuracy; (W): Worst client accuracy; (G): Global model accuracy;
In the Non-IID case, at the first FL round, the Best, Worst,
and Global models are nowhere near one another, and this
is quite expected since not all clients were trained from all
classes. A good example is a Bot-IoT dataset, with the CNN
classifier, where K=15, the worst accuracy of the client was
01.00%, but with 504 of federated deep learning rounds,
this same client has an accuracy of 52.98% and the global
model achieved 90.35%. This means that this client was
able to benefit from the federated learning approach even
though it has very limited knowledge of the attack classes
in its local private data.
3) Comparison
The centralized intrusion detection approaches are capable
of detecting intrusions with high accuracy. However, there
are problems with these practices. First, and most impor-
tantly, privacy issues, since it requires data to be collected
at a single entity, thus making it easier for an attacker to
target a single location for all data, if that single entity is
compromised, all sensitive data will be breached. Second,
given the huge flow of data coming from the end devices to
that single entity, latency, and processing is major concerns
that must be addressed.
Federated learning-based intrusion detection systems, on
the other hand, significantly decrease the previous issues
with decent detection accuracy, and in many cases, it
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FIGURE 17: Learning Performances
approached the performance of a centralized approach as
we showed with our federated deep learning models. Fur-
thermore, by taking into account that the field of federated
learning is in its developmental stage, we expect that in
the future, federated learning will replace centralized and
traditional learning approaches in many machine learning-
based domains, especially in areas where data privacy is a
real concern.
VII. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY AND OPEN
CHALLENGES
Federated learning is an emerging research area that is still
in its developmental stage. Although it has a lot of poten-
tial in different IoT-based application areas, the practical
implementation of federated learning presents several open
challenges, as discussed below.
A. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY
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1) IoT Applications:
The study shows that the federated deep learning-based
security and privacy systems can be applied for several types
of IoT applications, including, Industrial Internet of Things,
Edge Computing, Internet of Drones, Internet of Healthcare
Things, Cloud Computing, 5G-enabled IoT, Internet of
Vehicles, Mobile Crowdsensing, etc.
2) Intrusion and malware detection:
The study presents the importance of using federated deep
learning by intrusion detection systems and malware detec-
tion systems as a decentralized machine learning approach
for detecting cyber security attacks in IoT networks.
3) When Federated Learning Meets Blockchain:
The study shows that blockchain technology can be inte-
grated with federated deep learning for cyber security in
IoT networks. This combination reduces the threat of data
leakage and enables data owners to have more control over
the access to stored and shared data.
4) Vulnerabilities of Federated Deep Learning:
The study presents the importance of defending against
the vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries in
federated deep learning-based systems for IoT networks.
These adversaries can use cyber security attacks such as
adversarial attacks or poisoning attacks to degrading the
accuracy of a machine learning model or deduce if an IoT
device has been involved in some mission from their local
model updates.
5) Federated Deep Learning versus Classical Machine
Learning:
The primary motivation for conducting this study was to
investigate the effectiveness of federated deep learning ver-
sus conventional machine learning for cybersecurity in IoT
networks. Based on the performance evaluation under three
new real IoT traffic datasets, namely, the Bot-IoT dataset,
the MQTTset dataset, and the TON_IoT dataset, the study
demonstrates that federated deep learning approaches (i.e.,
CNN, RNN, and DNN) outperform the classic/centralized
versions of machine learning (non-federated learning) in
assuring the privacy of IoT device data and provide the
higher accuracy in detecting attacks.
B. OPEN CHALLENGES AND CONSIDERATIONS
1) Security and Privacy Challenges:
Federated learning promises to protect the privacy of local
user data, however, recent studies have shown that the
involvement of specific participants can still be revealed
by analyzing the global model [163]. Although some tech-
niques have been used to overcome this problem, includ-
ing differential privacy [164], these approaches degrade
model performance or require additional conditions that are
not suitable for IoT networks, especially high computing
power [165]. Therefore, efficiently implemented federated
approaches that provide high performance and preserve pri-
vacy without additional computational overhead are strongly
required for IoT networks and applications.
2) IoT Network Settings Challenges:
The robustness of the federated deep learning system should
be considered since users and aggregators are required to
exchange parameters over the IoT network. In addition,
communication channels and computational power are con-
strained in terms of capacity, as well as the presence of
various network issues such as bandwidth, interference,
and noise [165]. Hence, client access and limited network
reliability are significant research challenges in developing
a federated deep learning system for cyber security in IoT
applications.
3) Data-related Challenges:
The issue of identifying and eliminating bias of all kinds
(cognitive, sampling, reporting, and confirmation) in the data
generation process is a serious concern for ML research
in general. However, it is more complicated in FL due to
the fact that data is distributed over multiple parties. For
example, if IoT devices have varying data sizes, the FL-
based system may give more importance to the contributions
of the populations. In addition, If the global model update
depends on the latency of the IoT network, then networks
with slower devices or networks may be under-represented
[166]. The most important question that may arise is how
to develop a new FL-based strategy that can resist the
vulnerabilities (Poisoning attack, Jamming attack, Adver-
sarial attack, ...etc.) while considering the practicability of
deploying the solution, particularly in the context of low-
resource IoT devices.
4) FL Platforms Challenges:
Many IoT-based applications can benefit from FL due to
the amazing performance of collaborative learning in the
appropriate domains. Although there are various emerging
frameworks for FL in general, designing a specific IoT
framework based on FL is still an important research
topic that needs to take into account the underlying IoT
infrastructure.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we conducted a comparative study with an
experimental analysis of federated deep learning approaches
for cybersecurity in IoT applications. Specifically, we an-
alyzed the federated learning-based security and privacy
systems for several types of IoT applications, including,
Industrial IoT, Edge Computing, Internet of Drones, Internet
of Healthcare Things, Internet of Vehicles, etc. Then, we
reviewed the federated learning systems with blockchain and
malware/intrusion detection systems for IoT applications.
We reviewed the vulnerabilities that can be exploited by
adversaries in the federated learning-based security and
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privacy systems. We provided an experimental analysis of
federated deep learning with three deep learning approaches,
namely, RNN, CNN, and DNN. For each deep learning
model, we studied the performance of centralized and fed-
erated learning under three IoT traffic datasets, namely, the
Bot-IoT dataset, the MQTTset dataset, and the TON_IoT
dataset. The results demonstrate that federated deep learning
approaches can outperform the classic/centralized versions
of machine learning (non-federated learning) in assuring the
privacy of IoT device data and provides the highest accuracy
in detecting attacks.
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